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Finding Foreign Friends: National Self-Determination and
Related Norms as Strategic Resources during the Biafran War for
Independence, 1967–1970
Christopher Brucker
Friedrich Schiller-University of Jena, Germany
The study analyzes how the government of the Republic of Biafra used international norms to
win foreign support during its 1967–1970 campaign to secede from Nigeria. Secession
conflicts occur at the intersection of international and domestic politics. For independence
movements, support from outside is crucial. But, as Bridget Coggins has asked, how can
secession movements find “friends in high places”? International support for unilateral
secession attempts is strictly prohibited. Domestic and international asymmetry are limiting
secessionist foreign policy instruments to intangible means. Legitimacy is a central concept to
illuminate the phenomenon. In international politics, legitimacy depends on the external
perception of compliance with a canonical set of normative criteria. The international order
prioritizes (1) territorial integrity, (2) nonintervention, and (3) uti possidetis over (4) national
self-determination, (5) human rights, and (6) good governance. All six principles are
contested. Secession movements can make use of this normative ambivalence to justify their
claim in relation to the international community. They can use international norms
strategically to influence the perceptions of foreign actors about the legitimacy of the
secession claim to win external support. This concept is used to analyze the Biafran campaign
for independence from Nigeria from 1967 to 1970. The inquiry rests on a combination of
inductive and deductive research techniques and analyzes original documents such as official
publications from the government of Biafra and press releases issued by its public relations
agency, Markpress.
___________________________________________________________________________

The United Nations headquarters in New York is one of the most prominent architectural
symbols of international politics after World War II. In front of the Secretariat Building, the
flag of every UN member state waves over the UN Plaza. Every time the United Nations
accepts a new member, it adds a new national flag to the row of flagpoles in a special flagraising ceremony.1 At the official opening of the headquarters building in 1951, only sixty
flags flew at the site. By then, the architects already expected membership growth and
installed thirty more flagpoles for future admissions.2 Only nine years later, the number of
member states had grown to ninety-nine.3 In December 1960, the UN General Assembly
declared in its Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and
Peoples: “All peoples have the right to self-determination; by virtue of that right they freely
determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural
development.”4
For many peoples, fulfilling this right means one thing: establishing an independent,
sovereign state.5 UN admission is by far the clearest sign of independence and sovereignty in
the modern international system. As the symbolism at the UN Plaza demonstrates, the
emergence of new states is a dynamic process. The number of UN member states has now
grown to 193.6 This “trend,” as Tanisha Fazal and Ryan Griffiths have called it, continues.7
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South Sudan, the United Nation’s newest member, became independent from Sudan in 2011.8
As in South Sudan, most sovereign states belonged to larger countries before their
independence. Often, the flag-hoisting ceremony in New York was the pinnacle of a long
political struggle. More often, however, struggles for independence ended tragically.9
The area surrounding the UN building is a magnifying glass for the ups and downs of
state emergence. It is not only a place for celebration but also one for protest and grief.
Supported by friends from the United States, representatives of the unrecognized Republic of
Biafra, for example, in 1968 and 1969 repeatedly held protest rallies at the Dag
Hammarskjöld Plaza, a park near the UN Headquarters. With their national flag waving above
their heads, the Biafrans appealed to the United Nations to work toward peace in their bloody
conflict with the Nigerian central state and help them in their struggle for independence. To
their disappointment, neither the General Assembly nor General Secretary U Thant
responded.10
While the United Nations and its members support national self-determination in
principle, they are cautious of encouraging people within existing countries to aim for
independent statehood. Instead, they desire the sovereignty of existing states and the
preservation of the territorial status quo in international politics.11 The rapid increase in the
number of states during the 1960s was possible only because the former colonial states
realized the illegitimacy of colonialism in international politics and voluntarily granted their
former colonies independence. For a brief period, the international community took the
principle of national self-determination as an explicit right to independent statehood. Its
scope, however, was restricted to former colonies. For peoples whose boundaries were not
congruent with colonial demarcations, the international community did not regard the claim to
self-determination as sufficient cause to justify independent statehood.12 An all too
welcoming attitude, statesmen feared, would initiate a contagious spread of minority demands
that would eventually lead to a “balkanization” of states and the disruption of the international
order.13
Still, groups within existing states claim independence, though they are not entitled to the
restrictive reading of self-determination.14 When such a claim to independence is accepted
neither by the state of which the people in question is a part, the metropolitan state, nor by the
international community, we speak of unilateral secession.15 The driving force behind a
secession attempt is called secessionism. It is a political course of action that is mostly, but
not always, carried out in the name of a distinct ethnic community.16 Secessionist movements,
the agents of secessionism,17 claim a certain territory, often perceived as a homeland, and aim
to withdraw it from the “authority of a larger state of which it is a part.”18 The restriction of
metropolitan control over the territory in question is the foundation for the establishment of an
independent state.19 To safeguard the independence of their state, secessionists seek
international diplomatic recognition.20
Experiences of discrimination, trigger events that threaten their survival, and in-group
dynamics but also situations of metropolitan weakness are important forces that bring ethnic
groups to desire secession, even if their chances are bleak.21 Metropoles normally reject
secession claims straightaway.22 Because both actors claim exclusive control over the same
territory, secession conflicts swiftly reach a deadlock and are often fought with much zeal.23
Secession is exceptionally difficult to achieve but not impossible.24 According to John Wood,
we should understand secession as a dynamic process. Secessionist movements need to apply
a bundle of different strategies and interact with a variety of actors at several levels to reach
their goal.25
For secessionist movements, support from outside is crucial. Foreign support is necessary
to reverse domestic asymmetry because the metropole is often a superior opponent. Secession
movements also need diplomatic recognition to establish an independent state.26 Thus,
secession conflicts are internationalized conflicts.27 But support from “friends in high places,”
1
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as Bridget Coggins has called them,28 does not come from nothing. At the international level,
the domestic asymmetry continues. Because of the potentially disrupting consequences for the
metropolitan state in question as well as for the international order itself, the handling of
secessionist demands is a delicate matter for third states.29 Intervening on behalf of
secessionists is a strict “taboo.”30 This prohibition also applies to premature recognition
without metropolitan consent.31 As Eiki Berg states, “international law does not have a
logically consistent legal doctrine that would treat sovereignty claims in a universal
manner.”32 Consequently, whether to support or recognize a secessionist movement is an
individual political decision made by sovereign states based on their interests and not an
automatism.33 Sovereign states, however, are initially reluctant to support secession
movements and instead treat them as nonstate actors. Because of this twofold asymmetry,
secessionist instruments to find foreign support are often limited to intangible means. Thus,
secessionist movements need to persuade foreign actors to support them.34
At the same time, the international community’s handling of secessionist demands is
constantly changing.35 The rapid increase in the number of states is a clear sign that the
international territorial order is dynamic and in flux.36 Shifting notions of justice and
appropriateness in international politics influence the willingness of states to accept or
promote territorial changes.37 The secession practice is not regulated exclusively by restrictive
principles such as the preservation of territorial integrity, the ban on foreign intervention, and
uti possidetis, a regulation that restricts the right to state emergence to former colonies and
first-order substates. Although hedged since the 1960s, national self-determination is still a
central principle in international politics. Moreover, notions that condition sovereignty on
certain behavior such as the protection of individual human rights, genocide prevention,
democracy, and good governance increasingly influence the discourse on secession.38
We know that secessionist movements justify their cause in relation to the international
community.39 What we barely know is how secessionists do so strategically. International
norms that tend to revise the territorial status quo might have a strategic value for secessionist
movements when it comes to finding foreign friends. To zoom into this neglected type of
secessionist action and shed light on the nexus of secessionist strategy, international norm
dynamics, and foreign interference, this article explores the following research question: How
do secessionist movements use international norms to win external support? I analyze a
historical case that has rarely been considered in recent secession research: the Biafran
campaign for independence from Nigeria, 1967 to 1970.
According to Alexis Heraclides, secession movements seek to “meet international
normative standards of legitimacy” as part of their international activities.40 Janice Mueller
has investigated how the Tamil Liberation Army and the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA)
“echoed” human rights to improve their strategic positions in the intrastate conflict.41 Lee
Seymour has shown how the Kosovo government strategically invoked human rights to
secure premature recognition after the declaration of independence in 2008.42 Alan Kuperman
has investigated how the KLA has manipulated the international perception of the Kosovo
conflict to prompt the international community to intervene.43 Coggins has introduced the
concept of rebel diplomacy that pinpoints the “strategic use of talk” violent nonstate actors
exert to acquire political goals.44 Fazal has illuminated how violent rebels make sure to adhere
to the international law of war to display their behavior as legitimate.45 Matt Qvortrup has
investigated the strategic calculus underlying independence referenda and how certain
technical conditions influence international perceptions of their legitimacy.46 According to
Fiona McConnell, Terri Moreau, and Jason Dittmer, secession movements (as well as other
nonstate actors) “imitate” official state diplomacy when they interact with the international
community to enhance their legitimacy and become recognized as equivalent actors.47
Legitimacy is a sensible starting point for the analysis. What we are looking for also
seems to have something to do with communicative actions as well as perceptional factors. As
2
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we have seen, international law does not entail any automatism for sovereign states to support
secessionist movements. But normative ambiguities inherent in the international territorial
order might offer “incentives”48 for secessionist movements to use international norms as
strategic means to circumvent the metropolitan obstruction and bring sovereign states to
intervene. To seize the phenomenon, I introduce the notion of secessionist norm politics, a
concept inspired both by Bernd Bucher’s work in the subfield of critical constructivism within
the discipline of international relations49 and the theory of legitimacy management in the
sociology of organizations.50
The Biafran case seems fruitful to illuminate the research problem because it has been
one of the earliest instances of highly internationalized and mediatized intrastate conflict.51 At
the time, the conflict was referred to as a “war of words.”52 Although well documented, the
conflict is quite unknown in recent secession research. More recently, historians have
carefully examined the conflict and highlighted the extensive international debate on
questions of human rights and genocide it sparked.53 The period under investigation begins
with the declaration of independence in May 1967 and ends with the capitulation of Biafra in
January 1970. The study analyzes original documents such as official publications from the
government of Biafra and press releases issued by its own public relations agency, Markpress.
The analysis begins by introducing a strategic perspective to the notion of international
legitimacy and develops a tentative concept of secessionist norm politics that makes it
possible to discover secessionist norm use. The analysis then works out international and
domestic context factors of the Biafran independence conflict. Finally, it investigates the
Biafran strategy to win international support and how it unfolded. This investigation considers
the conflict in three phases and ends by drawing conclusions that refine the theoretical
concept.

Norms and Legitimacy: A Strategic Perspective
Circumventing domestic obstruction and persuading states to breach the secession taboo is a
strategic imperative for secessionist movements. Because of domestic and international
asymmetry, foreign policy instruments of secession movements are limited to intangible,
ideational, or cognitive means.54
The straightforward concept of legitimacy management in the sociology of organizations
can help us uncover strategies that rest on the use of normative means. Mark Suchman offers
a basic definition of legitimacy: the “perception that the actions of an entity are appropriate
within some socially constructed system of norms.”55 An audience attributes legitimacy.
Audience members base their decision to legitimize an actor on the evaluation of its
compliance with specific legitimacy criteria. These criteria are identical with norms that have
a high social resonance within the audience. Legitimation has profound consequences because
it enables actors to act unhindered and often secures them active support by legitimizing
actors.56
For this reason, organizations seek to manage their legitimacy by influencing the
perceptions of external actors. To gain, maintain, or repair legitimacy, organizations can
openly adjust their behavior to the norms that are relevant to the audience they want to
convince.57 Or they can manipulate the perceptions of their target audience by building
“legitimacy facades.”58 Both varieties rest on the use of norms. Since legitimacy is a matter of
perception, legitimacy management occurs mainly in such areas as mass media or public
relations.59 Legitimacy management then is an intangible and indirect strategy to win external
support by using the norms that resonate within a community of potential supporters. The
norms that legitimacy managers use are essentially strategic means.
To capture agency in norm dynamics, Bucher has introduced the promising concept of
international norm politics, illuminating “processes of norm articulation, propagation,
3
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contestation, adaption, adoption, and rejection.”60 The proposed research agenda focuses on
“agents embedded within social arrangements and how their purposeful actions lead to the
unintended social construction of reality.”61 Actors that pursue norm politics exercise power
by deploying, evoking, or using symbolic “normative, or judicial resources to directly alter
what other international actors do.”62 The approach incorporates the classic definition of
international norms as “standards of appropriate behavior.”63
In international law, secession is somewhat unregulated and commonly deemed a matter
of domestic politics outside the scope of international jurisdiction. For fears of encouraging
minorities and setting disrupting precedents, states refrain from formulating clear-cut rules for
legitimate secession. Despite the clear preference for territorial integrity, nonintervention, and
uti possidetis, the competing notion of national self-determination is still a highly important
principle in international law. Moreover, notions that tend to “relativize sovereignty,”64 such
as individual human rights, genocide prevention, and good governance, increasingly penetrate
the secession discourse. This “pouring in” of norms, which were not originally part of the
normative framework regarding state emergence, is the result of a trend in international
politics toward greater respect for humanitarian concerns.65 We can now observe a
“simultaneity” of contradicting and contested principles.66
Secession conflicts occur in an international environment that is regulated by a mesh of
six norms: (1) territorial integrity, (2) nonintervention, and (3) uti possidetis, (4) national selfdetermination, (5) human rights/genocide, and (6) good governance. They tend to prompt
either the preservation of the current territorial status quo (1–3) or its revision (4–6).67 While
the status-quo oriented norms are based on the conservative paradigm of state sovereignty, the
revisionist norms can be associated with a broader dynamic toward liberal internationalism.
Although the status quo principles are prioritized in theory and practice, all six norms share
some ambivalences and controversies, especially if one tries to balance them. Thus, some
norms concerning secession and statehood clash in certain situations.68
I suppose that the normative ambiguities and dynamics inherent in the territorial order
might offer possible access points for secessionist norm use at the international level. For
secession movements, as depicted by Rafael Biermann, international norms not only are
neutral rules of the game but appear as “legitimation device[s]” that they interpret selectively
and put forward to pursue their interests.69 International norms are strategic means for
secessionist movements to win international support. Secessionist movements use the societal
resonance of international norms and connect the internal conflict to international norm
dynamics to bring states to “do something [they] would not otherwise do”70: break the
secession taboo and interfere in the secession conflict on behalf of the secessionist movement.
Summing up the theoretical considerations, I propose the following theoretical concept:
Secessionist norm politics encompass the strategic use of international norms to influence the
perceptions of foreign actors about the legitimacy of the secession claim to win external
support.
Following Heraclides, I incorporate a rather broad understanding of international support
as an action: “(1) . . . that was deliberately aimed at supporting the position of the
secessionists; (2) . . . enhanced the secessionist position, irrespective of the state’s intention;
and (3) defined by the secessionists themselves . . . as helpful.”71 Foreign support includes
intangible measures such as verbal acknowledgment and diplomatic advocacy but also
tangible forms such as military aid and military intervention.72 Formal diplomatic recognition
is another highly valuable form of outside support since it can open the door for a dynamic
spread of foreign assistance, as Coggins has stated.73
With those tentative ideas about secession movements and their use of international
norms in mind, we can proceed to the analysis.
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The Case of Biafra
The International and Regional Context: Norms and Politics in the Global Sixties
The Biafran secession conflict erupted right after the heyday of national self-determination
during decolonization.74 Once most of the former colonies successfully achieved
independence during the 1960s, the international community quickly began to “domesticate”75
the principle. To prevent a chaotic break-up of old and new states, and to safeguard
international stability during the cold war, all major and regional powers went back to
privileging the competing norms of territorial integrity and nonintervention.76 To regulate
decolonization, the international community imposed a “colonial grid” on the new states, as
Christopher Clapham has put it.77 This practice involved a takeover of colonial administrative
boundaries as state borders and referred to the ancient principle of interstate conduct uti
possidetis.78 In consequence, the application of national self-determination as a right to
emerge “as a sovereign independent state” was restricted to “territories . . . of the colonial
type,”79 as General Assembly Resolution 1541 of December 1960 affirmed. For distinct
groups within the newly established states, the self-determination should mean substate
autonomy.80 This development led to a highly ambivalent situation as the principle of national
self-determination was theoretically affirmed and practically contained at the same time.81
The period was also a decade of political turmoil in many parts of the world, often
subsumed under the term the global sixties.82 Nonstate actors increasingly influenced
international politics. The desire for a revolutionary change in the Western World connected
with a growing awareness of colonial and postcolonial matters. The Vietnam War and its
immersive international media coverage catalyzed this dynamic.83 Influenced by the cold war
dualism between liberal democracy and state socialism, the question of development loomed
over large parts of the postcolonial world and increasingly aroused Western societies.84 The
rise of mass media and the beginnings of a culture of Holocaust remembrance in Western
Europe further contributed to this profound transformation.85 While the notion of national
self-determination temporarily lost its momentum, human rights and genocide, ideas that
originated in the postwar years but gained prominence in the course of decolonization,
became central normative reference points for an emerging international civil society.86 To
celebrate the breakthrough of international humanitarianism, UNESCO declared 1968 the
International Year of Human Rights.87
Domestic Determinants of the Biafran Secession
The Biafran independence conflict was rooted in a complex combination of colonial heritage,
state weakness, identity politics, and communal violence. Nigeria became independent from
Britain in 1960. Like most postcolonial states, it inherited the boundaries of the former
colonial administration. Typically for British colonial politics, the inner and outer boundaries
were determined arbitrarily, with complete disregard for the enormous social diversity of the
vast territory.88 After independence, the country was demarcated by three federal units,
roughly modeled on the settlement patterns of the dominant ethnic groups: the Muslim HausaFulani in the north, the Christian Igbo in the east, and the Yoruba in the southwest. Since the
political system deliberately restricted the power of the federal state, the substates had many
opportunities for separate development. By the mid-1960s, they already diverged
significantly.89
Latent interethnic tensions came to the fore when two failed coups d’état triggered a
federal crisis in 1966. The federal government presented the events as acts of the Igbo and
accused the group of plotting for a takeover. Spurred on by these reproaches, local unrest in
the Northern Region escalated into mob violence against Igbo residents that killed about thirty
thousand people. Shocked by the events, the Eastern administration, which had to deal with a
5
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wave of Igbo refugees that had fled the North, demanded increased autonomy and further
political devolution of the federation. A series of failed negotiation attempts and a federal
decree that suspended the political autonomy of all substates triggered the Eastern
administration to declare secession in May 1967. To reintegrate the Eastern Region and
prevent other regions from seceding, the federal army began a military campaign in July.90
The conflict went through three stages: (1) a military stalemate that lasted from June 1967 to
spring 1968; (2) guerilla warfare caused by a federal blockade till spring 1969; and (3) a
federal offensive that ceased with the Biafran capitulation in January 1970.91
Introducing Biafra: Spring 1967–Spring 1968
On the morning of Tuesday, May 30, 1967, military governor Odumegwu Ojukwu officially
declared the independence of the Republic of Biafra. Several national and international media
correspondents attended the event. During the ceremony, Ojuwku presented the new national
flag, which consisted of three horizontal squares in red, black, and green with a yellow
pictogram of a rising sun in its center, a design inspired by the Pan-African flag.92 Like many
other documents of this kind,93 the Biafran Proclamation of Independence was heavily
inspired by the American Declaration of Independence of 1776. According to the Biafran
version, the Biafrans had “certain inalienable rights” that could “no longer be protected . . . by
any Government based outside Eastern Nigeria.”94
During the following months, the Biafran attention was drawn to tasks such as internal
mobilization and warfare.95 “Introducing the Republic of Biafra,” as one leaflet, published in
Europe during the period, stated in its title, was the primary aim of the Biafran campaign at
the international level. The publication portrays the Biafran secession as a consequence of
decolonization and the breakup of the “artificial geographical unit” Nigeria.96 Biafra, the
document declares, “opted for self-determination after a long period of heart-searching and
after making desperate efforts to save the Federation of Nigeria from disintegration.”97
According to the publication, the Biafrans had a historical and cultural “uniqueness” that
made them distinct from other Nigerian ethnicities.98 From the beginning of the conflict, the
Biafran government acted as if Biafra were already a fully independent state. In White Paper
on Future Association, published internationally in August 1967, the government affirmed the
sovereignty of the new republic, portrayed the Biafran secession as a result of the break-up of
Nigeria, and even offered the federal state cooperative relations.99
The international community, however, largely ignored the conflict.100 In July 1967, the
US magazine Jet described it as “the war between blacks nobody cares about.”101 Unlike the
United States, which firmly ruled out any premature recognition already in June,102 most
states did not even concern themselves with the issue. In September, the Organization of
African Unity (OAU) deemed the conflict an “internal affair, the solution of which is
primarily the responsibility of the Nigerians itself.”103 Asked by a journalist for the Canadian
position on the Biafran war, Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau answered in early 1968: “Where’s
Biafra?”104
Two significant developments throughout winter 1967/68 forced the Biafran government
to review and intensify its international activities: First, thanks to its material might and
British reinforcements, the federal army was able to gain the upper hand on the battlefield and
conquer large areas of the Biafran territory. The federal military also succeeded in
establishing a blockade around the area that effectively isolated Biafra and its population of
fourteen million people from the outside world. As a consequence, Biafra ran short of
medicines, seeds, and food.105 Second, shocked by the increasingly problematic humanitarian
situation in the area, relief workers and church representatives who had visited Biafra began
to express their concerns in the international media.106 In October, Pope Paul VI published his
pamphlet On Africa, in which he calls on Christians on the continent to step in “when
violence, as has unfortunately happened, assumes almost the proportions of genocide, when
6

New England Journal of Public Policy
within the boundaries of the same country different racial groups are pitted against one
another.”107 Ojukwu realized the strategic value of this new international attention as he
declared in his Christmas broadcast “The Vision of Biafra” in December 1967: “The world is
beginning to see the justness of our cause.”108
Fight for Survival: Spring 1968–Spring 1969
As the prospects of a military victory vanished, the Biafran government and its Ministry of
Information radically intensified their attempts to internationalize the conflict. Essential for
the new strategy was the foundation of the international public relations agency Markpress
News Feature Service – Biafran Overseas Press Division in January 1968. Run by the British
media expert William Bernhardt, the professional enterprise took offices in Geneva,
Switzerland. According to Morris Davis, the Markpress mailing list contained more than four
thousand addressees, including all members of the British Parliament, most major
newspapers, news agencies, and several civil society organizations.109 Key publications
included the periodical Biafra Newsletter and a significant number of professional press
releases, of which Markpress issued several hundred within just two years.110
The Biafran publications contained current news from the front, commentaries of recent
international events, reports of federal atrocities, speeches by Biafran officials, minutes of
press conferences, and press reviews with comments favorable toward Biafra. Markpress also
published comprehensive volumes of programmatic statements and documents by the Biafran
government.111 The public relations agency worked closely with the Biafran government and
received information by Telex almost daily. Usually, the media experts transformed the
Biafran telegrams into proper press releases without editing them much, as Bernhardt told the
BBC in 1968.112 Also, the service managed to fly foreign journalists into the enclave.
According to Davis, the typical press tour consisted of a round of press conferences and talks
with the Biafran government. After that, the foreign journalists had a chance to visit the
countryside, refugee camps, and the conflict-zone.113 Markpress, in turn, issued minutes and
reports of the events.114 Thus, Markpress became Biafra’s central “means of communication
[to the] outside world,” as Bernhard states in a letter addressed to “Editors Receiving
Markpress Releases.”115 In another letter, addressed to the “Editors of the German Press List,”
Bernhardt reveals the calculus of his endeavors: “Maximum coverage.”116
During a press conference in spring 1968, Ojukwu reflected on the new strategy: “The
war aims of Biafra are very simple: to delay the enemy for as long as possible until world
conscience is aroused and then to seek world support in what is essentially a human
problem.”117 The strategy, he said, aimed at influencing “world opinion.”118 In another press
release, Ojukwu declared that he hoped the new strategy would inspire Western governments
to “seriously re-examine their position in the war against Biafra.”119 “Public opinion,”
Ntieyong Akpan, chief of staff under Ojukwu, recalled of the Biafran approach in his
memoirs, “would force . . . governments to take positive action in favor of Biafra.”120 He
further stated: “The longer the war lasted, the more sympathy Biafra would have from the
world. Such sympathy might bring more recognition, thus making it possible for Biafra to
survive as an independent entity from the rest of Nigeria.”121 Winning international support
now was a top priority for the Biafrans.
Markpress, with the Ministry of Information, also ensured that the Biafran publications
contained a comprehensive wording. Rather than speaking of a struggle of an African people
for self-determination, the Biafrans began to display the conflict as a “War of Survival.”122
Genocide and human rights became the central normative reference points for the new
strategy, allowing the Biafrans to pick up on an interpretation of the conflict that eyewitnesses
had put forward during fall 1967.123 According to Roy Doron, who has investigated the
Biafran government’s strategy to mobilize internal support beginning in early 1968, the
7
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people of Biafra were sure that a genocide impended.124 In a rather eclectic fashion, the
Biafrans referred to sources of international law such as the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights, the Geneva Convention, the UN Year of Human Rights, and the Genocide
Convention.125 The following passage from a pamphlet titled Genocide Breaks up Nations,
issued by the Ministry of Information, shows this concern clearly: “In this era of human rights
and competing social systems, it must be regarded as a fundamental law of politics that
genocide will always result in the creation of a new state for the protection of the victims of
this most abominable of all crimes.”126 Reflecting on the reluctant role of the OAU, the
pamphlet further states: “Those African leaders who are opposed to self-determination for
Biafrans are actually aiding and abetting genocide.”127
To verify these accusations, the Biafrans and Markpress presented plenty of evidence.
Throughout the conflict, the Biafrans repeatedly recalled the pogroms of 1966 as examples of
the federal desire to exterminate the Biafran people.128 As the fighting intensified in early
summer 1968, the federal war campaign delivered even more proof. Usually, Markpress
issued detailed descriptions of atrocities, often backed up by eyewitness reports. Among the
reported incidents were air raids on nonmilitary facilities, such as hospitals and markets,
forced displacement of civilians, and the poisoning of humanitarian relief supplies.129
Markpress also extensively covered the blockade and its effects on civilians.130 To validate
the allegations, Markpress invited photojournalists to its press tours. During those trips,
journalists experienced the human catastrophe firsthand and covered it extensively.131 Naked,
miserable, and malnourished children became central motives.132
Humanitarian relief was high on the Biafran wish list from the very beginning.133 In
response to the tense humanitarian situation and the worsening of the food crisis, Christopher
Mojekwu, Biafran minister for home affairs, issued a statement demanding “action and not
words while such large numbers of people are suffering starvation and imminent death.”134
During an international press conference, Ojukwu stated: “Every nation has a moral duty to
help Biafrans defend themselves.”135 In a message sent to the president of the UN General
Assembly, the Biafran government asked the assembly to “avail itself immediately of article 8
of the Genocide Convention to take such action under the charter as they consider appropriate
for the prevention, and suppression of acts of genocide.”136 To reverse the military
asymmetry, the Biafrans repeatedly demanded a weapons embargo on Nigeria.137
Calls for support also included pleas for more direct forms of “intervention.”138 These
actions should lever the federal government to accept a cease-fire and encompass “efforts to
bringing pressure to bear on [Lieutenant-Colonel Yakubu] Gowon and to make him get down
to a conference table.”139 Those appeals also included calls for the OAU to intensify its
mediation efforts and toward the UN to put the conflict on the agenda of the General
Assembly to work toward a cease-fire.140 According to the Biafran government, secession was
the last resort to prevent a “final solution.”141 “Sovereignty,” Ojukwu declared, “is the only
possible way of ensuring the Biafrans have exclusive control of the protection of their own
lives, liberty, and prosperity.”142 A high-ranking Biafran official demanded in a speech: “Give
Biafra diplomatic recognition and save 14 million Africans from extinction.”143 For the
Biafran government, diplomatic recognition mattered not only because it reflected “political
realities,” as Ojukwu contemplated. Widespread recognition would be “one way of getting the
other side around the conference table.”144 The idea was that a ceasefire and negotiations
would pave the way for an independence referendum and the deployment of an international
peacekeeping force.145
In April, the Biafran campaign obtained its first breakthrough with the diplomatic
recognition by Tanzania. In the official statement, the Tanzanian government under President
Julius Nyerere, justified the step with humanitarian concerns and a comparison that fitted the
Biafran genocide narrative: “The Biafrans have now suffered the same kind of rejection
within their state that the Jews of Germany experienced. Fortunately, they already had a
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homeland. They have retreated to it for their own protection, and for the same reason—after
all other efforts had failed—they have declared it to be an independent state. In light of these
circumstances, Tanzania feels obliged to recognize the setback of African Unity which has
occurred.”146 Biafra reacted with great enthusiasm. The Biafra Sun, Biafra’s leading
newspaper, enthusiastically praised Nyerere’s “historic statement.”147 Ojukwu declared
afterward: “I think that Tanzania having, as it were, broken the ice, the true feeling of Africa
will now be demonstrated.”148 The conflict, Ojukwu further declared, “has ceased to be an
internal problem of Nigeria.”149 In May, the Ivory Coast, Gabon, and Zambia recognized
Biafra as a sovereign state.150 All four states regarded the act as an exceptional decision and
justified it with humanitarian concerns.151 Félix Houphouët-Boigny, president of the Ivory
Coast, declared at a press conference in Paris: “Unity is for the living, not the dead.”152 This
wave of premature recognition boosted the Biafran morale greatly, as Akpan recalled.153 “We
have no doubt,” Ojukwu stated in July, “that Continental Europe will soon follow the lead of
our friends in Tanzania, Gabon, Ivory Coast and Zambia in according Biafra the right to
existence.”154
As the Biafran government predicted, diplomatic recognition helped to persuade the
OAU to mediate between the conflict parties. The talks in Kampala, Uganda, however, failed
after only five days because neither side was willing to compromise.155 But the Biafran
delegation took the chance to present its allegations at a high-level regional forum. In his
speech, the Biafran delegate Louis Mbanefo compared the conflict to the Holocaust and
praised the “support . . . by a number of African states which have recognized the sovereignty
of Biafra.”156 Afterward, the Biafran government called out the federal government for its
dishonest attitude during the conference.157 As Akpan later admitted, “the strategy . . . was to
do more to obtain additional diplomatic recognition than for successful peace negotiations.”158
Soon after the first press visits, international mass media began to publish reports from
the area. Major tabloids such as the German Stern and Life magazine illustrated their stories
with drastic pictures of malnourished children.159 Most articles adopted Biafran wordings.
Time correspondents James Wilde and Friedel Ungeheuer, for example, wrote in their lengthy
report: “The Ibos are convinced that they are fighting not only for independence but for their
survival as a people.”160 The German Spiegel issue of August 19, 1968, features a picture of
naked Biafrans on its front page, accompanied by the headline: “Biafra. Death Sentence for a
People.”161 According to Lasse Heerten, the conflict had become an “international media
event.”162 Markpress and the Biafran government were well aware of their media impact and
tried to harness the international arousal, as press releases with news clippings prove.163
In June, the representative of the Republic of Biafra in New York issued a press release
in which he insisted that “Individuals and Voluntary Organisations in America and Britain
should now organize pressure groups to force their home governments to bring the
Nigeria/Biafra war which they are sponsoring in favour of Nigeria to an end.”164 This “Biafra
lobby,” as one British journalist has called it,165 consisted of civil society organizations such
as the Aktion Biafra-Hilfe in Germany, the Britain-Biafra Association, and the American
Committee to Keep Biafra Alive.166 Geoffrey Birch and Dominic St. George from the BritainBiafra Association, for example, wrote in their pamphlet Biafra—The Case for Independence:
“World opinion must demand that the Lagos Government withdraw their troops from Biafra,
accept this new nation’s existence and be prepared to negotiate the closest form of economic
union possible after the bloodshed. Public opinion should not hesitate to make it known that
where human lives are being lost in their thousands, humanity must take precedence over
diplomatic niceties and superficial self-interest.”167 The Aktion Biafra-Hilfe urgently
demanded an “effective German contribution to the prevention of this biggest genocide since
the annihilation of the Jews.”168
As Ruth Bowert from the Zentrale der Aktions-Kommittees Biafra/Sudan stated in an
interview with the German Spiegel, the unions were in close contact with the Biafran
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government and aimed at “combining humanitarian relief with political action.”169 They
organized rallies, published periodicals with material about the conflict, and collected
donations.170 Markpress, in turn, circulated Biafra Union materials and covered their
events.171 Activists included people from the Biafran diaspora, but also journalists, relief
workers, Christians, and radical students concerned with Third World issues. This way, a
dense and very active transnational network emerged that helped to spread the Biafran
message and pressurized Western governments to support the secessionist republic.172
In July, the French Council of Ministers insisted, “The present conflict should be solved
on the basis of the right of peoples to self-determination.”173 A few weeks later, President
Charles de Gaulle confirmed this position and brought forward humanitarian considerations.
He conditioned diplomatic recognition on the behavior of African states and declared: “The
decision which has not been taken is not ruled out in the future.”174 Although this statement
never led to an official act of diplomatic recognition, it was regarded as highly significant by
the Biafrans.175 France also secretly equipped the Biafran army with armaments and
ammunition.176
Other governments maintained their refusal to support Biafra, though many of them
certainly felt the pressure of the lobby groups. Records of parliamentary debates reveal that
the Biafran case has been on the agenda of the House of Commons, where the discussion was
particularly heated,177 the US Senate Foreign Relations Committee,178 and the German
Bundestag during summer 1968.179 The UN was reluctant to interfere. At the UN Human
Rights Summit in Teheran in spring 1968, which was held to celebrate the International
Human Rights Year, the Biafran issue was absent.180 In his memoirs, U Thant later clarified
the UN position toward Biafra at the time: “Although I was deeply concerned by the
incredible human suffering and starvation in Biafra, there was never any doubt in my mind
that the conflict was strictly an internal matter and, therefore, outside the jurisdiction of the
United Nations.”181 Throughout the conflict, the OAU refrained from interfering without
Nigerian consent, kept its insistence on Nigeria’s territorial integrity and allowed talks only
on humanitarian relief.182 At its annual meeting in Algiers in September 1968, the
organization called “upon all member states of the United Nations and OAU to refrain from
any action detrimental to the peace, unity and territorial integrity of Nigeria.”183
The Biafran conflict also had a huge impact on international relief organizations. Since
summer, the combined operations of Oxfam, Caritas Internationalis, the World Council of
Churches, the International Committee of the Red Cross, and other humanitarian
organizations culminated in the biggest relief operation since World War II. In many relief
flights, the operations of the Biafran airlift managed to deliver large quantities of food and
medicines into the enclave. Funded in large part by donations raised by the Christian churches
and the Biafra lobby, the operation would eventually save hundreds of thousands of lives.184
The relief organizations advocated for Biafra but carefully avoided the call for recognition.
Instead, they displayed the matter as a purely humanitarian problem.185
According to Akpan, without international support, “the war would have ended in
September 1968.”186 In his Christmas Broadcast, Ojukwu praised the change in the
international treatment of the conflict: “Whereas at this time last year we were completely
isolated and were struggling alone in a world which seemed dead in conscience and devoid of
any respect for human life and dignity, today not only have we friends with courage to declare
sympathy and support for us, but also a world which has ceased to exhibit callous indifference
to the suffering of humanity and wanton destruction of human life.”187 As a consequence of
the airlift, however, the international debate increasingly focused on purely humanitarian
issues. Although this move guaranteed international attention and humanitarian relief, it posed
a severe dilemma for the secessionists. Ojukwu reflected on this dilemma in a commentary:
“Relief, no matter how massive, is at best a palliative.”188 Thanks to the airlift, however, mass
starvation was averted.189
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During the final months of 1968, the Biafran campaign slowly lost its momentum. In
August 1968, the Soviet Union invaded the Czechoslovak Republic to end the Prague Spring.
The attention of the international press quickly shifted to the events in Prague.190
Commentators increasingly denigrated the Biafran media campaign as “propaganda.”191 To
counter Biafran accusations, the federal government invited an international observer team to
“investigate . . . allegations of genocide and war crimes, as they were brought to the attention
of the observers.”192 In its first report from November 1968, the team concluded: “There is no
evidence of any intent by the federal troops to destroy the Ibo people or their property, and the
use of the term Genocide is unwarranted.”193 Additionally, the federal government invited
prominent Biafra supporters such as the renowned Africanist Margery Perham to visit military
offices in Lagos and investigate the war campaign. Her observations prompted her to
withdraw her previous genocide allegations publicly.194 In a radio broadcast, she appealed to
Ojukwu directly and condemned him for sacrificing civilians in order to “prolong a hopeless
struggle at their expense.”195 As a reaction to this sudden loss of credibility, the Biafran
campaign gradually changed its strategy until spring 1969.196
To Safeguard the Biafran Revolution: Spring 1969–January 1970
From early 1969 on, the Biafran strategy incorporated a more revolutionary and
transformative claim that referred to notions of statehood and governance. According to
Akpan, the new approach was initially meant to appeal to the Biafran population to keep up
the fight but quickly found its way into the international campaign.197 As Douglas Anthony
has put it, this new approach was in part influenced by radical ideas of postcolonial selfempowerment. The sources of inspiration included progressive thinkers such as Frantz Fanon,
who was very popular among the student movements of 1968, and the Biafra supporter
Nyerere, a theorist of African development.198
In his end-of-the-year message of 1968, Ojukwu praised the “Biafran revolution” for the
first time.199 Although the campaign still rested on a claim to self-determination and accused
Nigeria of genocide and abuses of human rights, the focus of the new approach was
increasingly on the achievements of the Biafran governance-building. It also included an
original approach to postcolonial statehood by portraying the Biafran secession as an “African
struggle against neo-colonialism”200 Ojukwu explained in an interview with Newsweek: “But
if by Balkanization you mean division, secession inclusive, then I say to you: ‘Look at
Europe.’ For a time, there were endless wars in Europe, incessant conflicts until the old
Europe and empires were dismantled until the Balkans were Balkanized—then came peace.
Why would one think that Balkanization for Europe and Biafranization for Africa would
produce different results? I do not think it would. . . Biafra has a message for Africa.”201 The
Biafran struggle for independence now was portrayed as a “beacon” for Africa and its
struggle to get rid of postcolonial influence and artificial boundaries. In a pamphlet, the
Biafran government stated: “Support Biafra and you support African nationalism!”202
This attempt to connect the Biafran secession to pan-African nationalism and radical
political activism found its most sophisticated expression in Ojukwu’s Ahiara Declaration—
Principles of the Biafran Revolution. Rather than focusing on allegations of genocide,
Ojukwu concentrated on the problem of neocolonialism. According to him, neocolonial rule
was a problem not only for Nigeria but for all multi-ethnic states in Africa. The dominance of
one people over another within a multiethnic state was an instrument for white domination.203
Biafra, in contrast, was portrayed as a “movement of true and patriotic Africans.”204 The
pamphlet dealt at length with the achievements of Biafran state-building and its
progressiveness that amalgamated indigenous principles with modern revolutionary ideas.205
Secession, therefore, was portrayed as a crucial act to “safeguard the Biafran revolution.”206
In a guest contribution for the German Zeit, Biafran emissary Elizabeth Etuk stated: “The
Biafran youth has now a new life goal: the buildup of a new society. For them, it’s not only
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sheer national self-determination. We are fighting for the ultimate liberation from colonial
domination, against alien paternalism for the sake of economic interests. We aim to build a
new political system that secures human lives, human rights and freedom, a system governed
by the people’s true representatives and not ones who are bribing and manipulating in the
name of the people.”207 Appealing to the student movement in Europe and the United States,
the Biafran government in a press release called on “progressive youths throughout the world”
to “rise up to the occasion and fight side by side with Biafran Freedom Fighters.”208
Despite the insistence on revolutionary statehood, the overall political impact during the
last year of the conflict was modest. In summer 1969, Biafran soldiers raided a Shell/BPoperated oil field near the Nigerian town of Kwale and took eighteen European oil workers
hostage. The Kwale incident briefly brought the conflict back on the international agenda but
contributed to the alienation of many international supporters.209 By August 1969, significant
Biafran attempts to exert influence at the international level largely ceased.210 Markpress
continued its work throughout the year. 211 From January to December 1969, the agency
published more than two hundred press releases and several books that included all essential
speeches by Ojukwu and the Biafran government.212 Many Biafra unions carried on with
publishing and raising funds.213 The American Committee to Keep Biafra Alive, for example,
was at its busiest during 1969, when it opened Biafra House in New York and began issuing
Current News from and about Biafra.214 On December 10, the anniversary of the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights, the organization held a rally in front of the UN building to
execute the “De-Celebration of Human Rights Day.”215
Despite all, the Biafran military collapsed in January 1970. In the early hours of January
11, Ojukwu fled the country.216 His successor, Philip Effiong, immediately surrendered to the
federal army and declared the end of the Republic of Biafra.217

Conclusion
Shortly after the end of the war, U Thant declared at a press conference: “As far as the
question of secession of a particular section of a Member State is concerned, the United
Nations’ attitude is unequivocal. As an international organization, the United Nations has
never accepted and does not accept, and I do not believe it will ever accept the principle of
secession of a part of its Member State.”218
Throughout the conflict, almost all states and international bodies such as the United
Nations and the OAU kept their preference for the preservation of Nigeria’s territorial
integrity and respected its claim to nonintervention. Nonetheless, Biafra managed to find
many foreign friends. The country’s rather eclectic use of national self-determination, human
rights/genocide, and good governance was successful in persuading people, organizations, and
even some states to support the secessionist republic.
The Biafran strategy underwent three phases: the introduction of Biafra to an
international audience (May 1967–spring 1968) and the portrayal of the Biafran cause as a
fight for survival (spring 1968–spring 1969) and an act to safeguard the Biafran revolution
(spring 1969–January 1970). The Biafran campaign made use of three international norms
that tend to revise the territorial status quo in international politics: national selfdetermination, human rights/genocide, and good governance. While the first usage rested on
the classic reading of national self-determination as a right of a people, the notion of human
rights and genocide prevention suggested secession as a remedy against extermination.
Arguments that referred to governance norms highlighted the prospects of the Biafran
secession.
Surprisingly, for the Biafrans, national self-determination was not the most relevant
international norm. It was used during the first phase right after the Biafrans declared their
independence and sought to find recognition by introducing Biafra to the international
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community. As soon as the Biafran government realized that international support is badly
needed but does not come by itself, it professionalized its efforts. The notion of national selfdetermination was not compelling enough to arouse the conscience of the world, as Ojukwu
stated in spring 1968. Accusations of human rights abuses and genocide seemed more
dramatic because they adapted to contemporary international debates. Displaying the conflict
as a fight for survival also had an inevitable emotional pull. Accusations of human rights
abuses and genocide could easily be proven. The main function of national self-determination
here was to harness notions of individual human rights and genocide prevention to justify the
secession of Biafra. The strategy connected the domestic conflict and its consequences to
international norm dynamics to appeal to foreign actors to live up to their commitments and
intervene on behalf of the Biafrans.
The attention, friendship, and sympathy the Biafrans won during summer 1968, however,
quickly diminished as soon as doubts arose concerning the genocide accusations. The
credibility problems prompted another strategic shift, this time toward the use of norms that
highlighted the achievements of Biafran state-building and the international prospects of an
independent Biafra. Here, the Biafran government sought to win international support by
highlighting benchmarks of governance it had achieved. And rather than presenting Biafra as
a unique case in need of urgent help, the new effort had a universal character because it
displayed the secession as a favorable precedent for other African societies.
Biafra used these norms (1) to put the conflict on the international agenda, (2) to frame
the international debate in a way that it appeared necessary to intervene, and (3) to pressure
states to do so.219 The Biafran government observed the international debate closely and
adjusted its strategy to the international impact. Gaining international attention was a
requirement to win external support. International norms here functioned as transmitters
because their universal prominence made it possible to connect the conflict to world
politics.220 Highlighting the fact that Nigeria withheld from the Biafrans the right to national
self-determination, violated their human rights, attempted to commit genocide on them, and
tried to halt their promising take on governance should raise international awareness. The
effort by Markpress to secure maximum coverage shows the importance of the international
media for the Biafran secession campaign and how beneficial agenda setting is for
secessionists. A comprehensive framing of the Biafran cause as a fight for self-determination,
survival, or revolution steered the international debate and suggested support or diplomatic
recognition as the only meaningful reaction. During summer 1968, the conflict received much
international attention, and most observers adopted the Biafran narrative.
Political pressure, in turn, could be realized only indirectly, through a support network of
friends of Biafra that came into existence in summer 1968. Civil society organizations that
were concerned with the Biafran cause used the Biafran wordings as rhetorical ammunition
and connected the Biafran struggle to contemporary domestic discourses. By reminding
governments of their international commitments, civil society organizations sought to
pressure politicians to support Biafra. National self-determination, human rights/genocide,
and good governance here served as transmitters between the secession conflict and internal
debates in the target societies.
As we have seen, the Biafran government was busy expressing its gratitude toward the
foreign “friends of Biafra” and echoed statements that were either favorable toward secession
or in line with the Biafran narrative. The Biafrans ached for every subtle sign of international
acknowledgment and much appreciated it. In a sense, such accomplishments meant some
“upgrading,” because it confirmed that Biafra was an international actor and capable of
entering into foreign relations. From the beginning, Biafra acted as if it were a sovereign state.
International and domestic strategies interlocked. At times, as Ojuwku stated, the priority of
the Biafran grand strategy was winning international support. The war efforts had the
objective to stop the Nigerian advance long enough to allow the Biafrans to win substantial
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international assistance. Throughout the conflict, the Biafrans called for almost all possible
variants of international support, such as humanitarian relief, diplomatic leverage, political
advocacy, material aid, military intervention, and premature recognition. International support
had immediate and tangible effects. International friendship mattered a lot to the Biafrans,
because it secured comprehensive aid that saved millions of lives, diplomatic backing, and
secret arms deliveries that enabled the Biafran military to hold the line for a substantial
period. Additionally, foreign assistance helped to amplify the secessionist media campaign.
This observation is consistent with Coggins’s concept of an incremental and dynamic spread
of international support.221 For some time, Biafra could control this momentum and use
international support in its attempt to find more external assistance. International support,
therefore, legitimized the Biafran cause.
This observation is proof of the agency secession movements can erect by pursuing
normative politics. The Biafrans not only attempted to manage the international legitimacy of
their cause. They also tried to delegitimize the federal government by accusing it of the abuse
of human rights and the intention to commit genocide. On one hand, the oughtness and sense
of moral duty that is characteristic of both norms played an exceptional role. On the other
hand, as we have seen, acquiring international legitimacy is not a simple matter. The Biafrans
had to deal with ignorance, reservations, criticism, and setbacks. Winning the sympathy of
domestic societies did not mean that the respective governments would support Biafra. It
became apparent also that secession movements compete with the metropole in their quest to
become legitimized by foreign actors.
By using international norms, secession movements can win substantial international
support and, as a consequence, achieve great success despite their domestic inferiority. The
media, civil society, and the public are important arenas for secessionist norm politics.
Although claiming them is difficult, international norms are more than mere political rhetoric.
Essentially, they are sources of power that practitioners and researchers should take seriously.
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